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Abstract
With the trend of adversarial attacks, researchers at-
tempt to fool trained object detectors in 2D scenes. Among
many of them, an intriguing new form of attack with po-
tential real-world usage is to append adversarial patches
(e.g. logos) to images. Nevertheless, much less have we
known about adversarial attacks from 3D rendering views,
which is essential for the attack to be persistently strong
in the physical world. This paper presents a new 3D ad-
versarial logo attack: we construct an arbitrary shape
logo from a 2D texture image and map this image into
a 3D adversarial logo via a texture mapping called logo
transformation. The resulting 3D adversarial logo is then
viewed as an adversarial texture enabling easy manip-
ulation of its shape and position. This greatly extends
the versatility of adversarial training for computer graph-
ics synthesized imagery. Contrary to the traditional ad-
versarial patch, this new form of attack is mapped into
the 3D object world and back-propagates to the 2D im-
age domain through differentiable rendering. In addition,
and unlike existing adversarial patches, our new 3D ad-
versarial logo is shown to fool state-of-the-art deep ob-
ject detectors robustly under model rotations, leading to
one step further for realistic attacks in the physical world.
Our codes are available at https://github.com/
TAMU-VITA/3D_Adversarial_Logo.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks are notoriously vulnerable: to
human-imperceivable perturbations or doctoring of im-
ages, resulting in the trained algorithms, drastically chang-
ing their recognition and predictions. To test the mis-
recognition or mis-detection vulnerability, [26] propose 2D
adversarial attacks, manipulating pixels on the image while
maintaining overall visual fidelity. This negligible pertur-
∗Equal Contribution.
Figure 1. Examples of our 3D adversarial logo attack on different
3D object meshes to fool a YOLOV2 detector. The 3D adversarial
patch (as a logo “G”) is viewed as part of the textures map over
3D human mesh models. When rendering the 3D mesh scene with
implanted 3D adversarial logos, and from multiple different angle
views (from −10 to 10 degrees) and with human postures, the at-
tack stays robust causing mis-recognition, i.e. making recognized
humans “disappear”. The first, second and third column shows
rendering results for a -10 degree angle view, a 0 degree angle
view and a 10 degree angle view, respectively. In each case, the
human with our adversarial logo is not recognized by a YOLOV2
detector.
bation to human eyes causes drastically false conclusions
with high confidence by trained deep neural networks. Nu-
merous adversarial attacks have been designed and tested
on deep learning tasks such as image classification and ob-
ject detection. Among extensive efforts, the focus recently
has shifted to only structurally editing certain local areas
on an image, known as patch adversarial attacks [2]. Thys
et al.[25] propose a pipeline to generate a 2D adversarial
patch and attach it to image pixels of humans appearing in
2D images. In principle, a person with this 2D adversar-
ial patch will fool or become “invisible” from deep learned
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human image detectors. However, such 2D image adver-
sarial patches are often not robust to image transformations,
and especially under multi-view 2D image synthesis in re-
constructed 3D computer graphics settings. Examining 2D
image renderings from 3D scene models using various pos-
sible human postures and different angle-view of humans,
the 2D attack can easily lose its own strength under such 3D
viewing transformations. Moreover, while square or rectan-
gular adversarial patches are typically under consideration,
more shape variations and their implications for the attack
performance have rarely been discussed before.
Can we naturally stitch a patch onto human clothes to
make the adversarial attack more versatile and realistic?
The defect in pure 2D scenarios leads us to consider the
3D adversarial attack, where we view a person as a 3D ob-
ject instead of its 2D projection. As an example, the do-
main of mesh adversarial attack [30] refers to deformations
in the mesh’s shape and texture level to fulfill the attack
goal. However, these 3D adversarial attacks were not yet
justified the concept of patch adversarial attack; they view
the entire texture and geometric information of 3D meshes
as attackable. Moreover, a noticeable branch of researches
shows that 2D images with infinitesimal rotation and shift
may cause huge perturbation in predictions [33, 1, 5], no
matter how negligible to human eyes. What if the pertur-
bation does not come from 2D scenarios and conditions
(e.g., 2D rotation and translation), but rather results from
physical world change, like 3D view rotations and body
postures changes? Furthermore, effective attacks on cer-
tain meshes do not imply a generalized effectiveness among
other meshes, e.g., the attack can be failed when changing
to a different clothes mesh. Those downsides motivate us to
develop more generalizable 3D adversarial patches.
The primary aim of this work is to generate a structured
patch in an arbitrary shape (called a “logo” by us), termed as
a 3D adversarial logo that, when appended to a 3D human
mesh, then rendered into 2D images, can consistently fool
the object detector under different human postures . A 3D
adversarial logo is defined over a subregion on 3D mesh that
can alter the textures and position. Then 3D human meshes
along with 3D adversarial logos are rendered on top of real-
life background images. The specific contributions of our
work are highlighted as:
• We propose a logo transformation pipeline to map an
arbitrary 2D shape (“logo”) into a mesh to form the
proposed 3D adversarial logos. Moreover, the 3D ad-
versarial logo is updated when the loss is propagated
back from the 2D adversarial logo, and eventually
propagated to the texture image. The pipeline can be
easily extended to multiple-mesh joint training.
• We propose a general 3D-to-2D adversarial attack pro-
tocol via physical rendering equipped with differentia-
bility. We render 3D meshes, with the 3D adversarial
logo attached on, into 2D scenarios and synthesize im-
ages that could fool the detector. The shape of our 3D
adversarial logo comes from the selected logo texture
in the 2D domain. Hence, we can perform versatile ad-
versarial training with shape and position controlled.
• We justify that our model can adapt to multi-angle sce-
narios with much richer variations than what can be de-
picted by 2D perturbations, taking one important step
towards studying the physical world fragility of deep
networks.
2. Related Work
2.1. Differentiable Mesh
Various tasks, including depth estimation as well as 3D
reconstruction from 2D images, have been explored with
deep neural networks and witnessed successes. Less con-
sidered is the reverse problem: How can we render the 3D
model back to 2D images to fulfill desired tasks?
Discrete operations in the two most popular rendering
methods (ray-tracing and rasterization) hamper the differ-
entiability. To fill in the gap, numerous approaches have
been proposed to edit mesh texture via gradient descent,
which provides the ground to combine traditional graph-
ical renderer with neural networks. Nguyen-Phuoc et al.
[17] propose a CNN architecture leveraging a projection
unit to render a voxel-based 3D object into 2D images. Un-
like the voxel-based method, Kato et al. [12] adopt linear-
gradient interpolation to overcome vanishing gradients in
rasterization-based rendering. Raj et al. [18] generate tex-
tures for 3D mesh through photo-realistic pictures. They
then apply RenderForCNN [23] to sample the viewpoints
that match the ones of input images, followed by adapting
CycleGAN [35] to generate textures for 2.5D information
rendered in the generated multi-viewpoints, and eventually
merge these textures into a single texture to render the ob-
ject into the 2D world.
2.2. Adversarial Patch in 2D Images
Adversarial attacks [24, 8, 10, 4, 9] are proposed to ana-
lyze the robustness of CNNs, and recently are increasingly
studied in object detection tasks, in the form of adversar-
ial patches. For example, [3] provides a stop sign attack to
Fast-RCNN [7], and [25] is fooling the YOLOv2 [19] object
detector through pixel-wise patch optimization. The target
patch with simple 2D transformations (such as rotation and
scaling) is applied to a near-human region in 2D real pho-
tos and then trained to fool with the object detector. To
demonstrate realistic adversarial attacks, they physically let
a person hold the 3D-printed patch and verify them to ”dis-
appear” in the object detector. Nevertheless, such attacks
are easily broken w.r.t. real-world 3D variations as pointed
out by [16]. Wiyatno et al. [28] propose to generate phys-
ical adversarial texture as a patch in backgrounds. Their
method allows the patch ”rotated” in 3D space and then
added back to 2D space. Xu et al. [31] discusses how to
incorporate physical deformation of T-shirts into patch ad-
versarial attacks, leading a forward step yet only in a fixed
camera view. A recent work by Huang et al. [11] attacks
region proposal network (RPN) by synthesizing semantic
patches that naturally anchored onto human cloth in the dig-
ital space. They test the garment in the physical world with
motions and justify their result in digital space.
2.3. Mesh Adversarial Attack
A 2D object can be considered as a projection from the
3D model. Therefore, attacking from 3D space and then
map to 2D space can be seen as a way of augmenting per-
turbation space. In recent two years, different adversarial
attacks scheme over 3D meshes have been proposed. For
instance, Tsai et al. [27] perturb the position of the point
cloud to generate an adversarial mesh that fools 3D shape
classifiers. Ti et al. [14] alter lighting and geometry infor-
mation of a physical model, to generate adversarial attacks,
by modeling the pixel in natural images as an interaction re-
sult of lighting condition and physical scene, such that the
pixel can maintain its natural appearance. More recently,
Xiao et al. [30] and Zeng et al. [32] generate adversarial
samples by altering the physical parameters (e.g. illumina-
tion) of rendering results from target objects. They gener-
ate meshes with negligible perturbations to the texture and
show that under certain rendering assumptions(e.g. fixed
camera view), the adversarial mesh can remain to deceive
state-of-the-art classifiers and detectors. Overall, most ex-
isting works perturb the image global texture etc., while the
idea of generating an adversarial sub-region/patch remains
unexplored in the 3D mesh domain.
3. The Proposed Framework
In this section, we seek a concrete solution to the 3d ad-
versarial logo attack, with the following goals in mind:
• The adversarial training is differentiable: we can
modify the source logo via end-to-end loss back-
propagation. The major challenge is to replace a tra-
ditional discrete render into a differentiable one and to
update corresponding texture maps over each mesh.
• The 3D adversarial logo is universal: for every distinct
human mesh, we hope to stitch the 3D adversarial logo
generates from the identical 2D logo texture. During
both training and testing, we only modify the rendered
texture of that logo to have it change concurrently with
the human mesh textures.
Our 3D adversarial logo attack pipeline is outlined in
Figure 2. In the training process, we first define a target logo
texture with given shape in the 2D domain (e.g., the charac-
ter “H”), and perturb the logo texture by random noise, con-
trast, and brightness. Then we map the logo texture to 3D
surfaces to form 3D adversarial logos on different meshes.
Then each human mesh and its 3D adversarial logo are to-
gether rendered into a 2D person image associated with
its 2D adversarial logo∗. These images of person with a
logo are further synthesized with background images, after
which we stream these synthesized images into the object
detector for adversarial training.
Due to the end-to-end differentiability, the training pro-
cess updates the 3D adversarial logo via back-propagation,
and further be back-propagated to the logo texture. Within
one epoch the above process will be conducted on all train-
ing meshes until all background images are trained with,
therefore ensuring the logo’s universal applicability to dif-
ferent meshes.
3.1. Logo Transformation
Different from existing 3D attacks, our network aims at a
universal patch attack across different input human meshes.
This is achieved by editing the 3D adversarial logo over
multiple meshes concurrently. Due to discrete polygonal
mesh settings, as well as the high possible degrees of dis-
tortions and deformations in different 3D meshes, training
one universal adversarial logo is highly challenging. We
illustrate our logo transformation strategy below, which of-
fers one explicit construction of textures coordinate map for
each 3D logo to generate our 3D adversarial logo. Detailed
implementations are included in supplementary materials.
Given the logo texture S define as an RGB image, in
order to convert it into a 3D logo L that can be edited on a
single human mesh, our proposed logo transformation com-
prises of two basic operations:
• 2D Mapping (M2D): Project a 3D logo surface onto
the 2D domain [0, 1]2 to generate texture coordinate
mapping.
• 3D Mapping (M3D): Extract color information from
the logo texture and map color information onto each
face over a 3D logo to composite a 3D adversarial logo.
The overall logo transformation can be denoted as:
L˜ = Tlogo(S,L) =M3D(S,M2D(L)) (1)
With the logo transformation, the chosen 2D logo shape
is mapped to 3D logo L on each distinct human mesh to
∗We refer to the 2D adversarial logo as the 2D image counterpart that
the 3D adversarial logo is rendered into.
Figure 2. The overall framework of our work. We start by choosing a logo texture image, which could be controlled to vary its brightness,
contrast, and noise as augmentation. Then we construct textures map that only maps into specific regions over each person’s mesh to
form 3D adversarial logos. We next apply a differentiable renderer to render the mesh together with its adversarial logo to synthesize the
2D person and 2D adversarial logo. The 2D adversarial logo will then be synthesized with the person image and background images to
generate training/testing images. Eventually, the training/testing images are fed into a target object detector for adversarial training/testing.
 3D Logo
 3D Adversarial Logo
Logo Texture
Logo Transformation
2D Mapping
Figure 3. Our Logo Transformation scheme. 3D logos are de-
tached from the person mesh as submeshes, then they are mapped
to the logo texture via texture mapping(2D Mapping) we construct.
3D adversarial logos are generated by assigning color information
onto 3D logos from the logo texture.
form the 3D adversarial logo L˜. By leveraging a differen-
tiable renderer (to be discussed in Section 3.2), when ren-
dering the 3D adversarial logos into adversarial logo im-
ages, the updates will be back-propagated from those im-
ages to 3D adversarial logos and thereby all the update in-
formation are aggregated to the logo texture. In our work,
the logo transformation is only constructed once and we fix
the texture coordinate map for each human mesh. When
forwarding to the detector, the color of our 3D adversarial
logos is obtained via distinctive texture coordinate maps and
hence we can update all 3D adversarial logos based on logo
texture in synchronization.
3.2. Differentiable Renderer
A differentiable renderer can take meshes as input and
update the mesh’s texture via back-propagation for differ-
ent purposes. Our work is built upon a specific renderer
called Neural 3D Mesh Renderer [13], while any other dif-
ferentiable renderer shall serve our goal here.
The Neural Renderer proposed in [13] generates q×q×q
color cubes for each face over the mesh. By adopting an
approximate rasterized gradient, where piece-wise constant
functions are approximated via linear interpolations, as well
as centroid color sampling, the renderer is capable of edit-
ing mesh’s texture through back-propagation. We apply
the Neural Renderer to render the 3D logo output from the
logo transformation, into various 2D adversarial logos, and
meanwhile, render the 3D human mesh. The last step is
to attach an (augmented) 2D adversarial logo to the corre-
sponding rendered 2D person image, and then synthesize
with a real background image, yielding the final 2D adver-
sarial image that aims to fool the object detector. During
back-propagation, the update in 2D adversarial logo images
will be fed back to the 3D adversarial logo, and eventually
back to the initial input of logo texture, thanks to the ren-
derer’s differentiability.
3.3. Training Against 3D Adversarial Logo Attacks
The aim of our work is to generate a 3D adversarial logo
on human mesh and the human mesh with this 3D adversar-
ial logo can fool the object detector when it is rendered into
a 2D image. We next discuss how we compose the training
loss to achieve this goal.
Disappearance Loss To fool an object detector is to di-
minish the confidence within bounding boxes that contain
the target object. Such that it cannot be detected. We ex-
ploit the disappearance loss [6], which takes the maximum
confidence of all bounding boxes that contain the target ob-
ject as the loss:
DIS(I, y) = Confmax(O(I, y)), (2)
where I is the image streamed into the object detector and
y is the object class label, O is the object detector that out-
puts bounding box predictions, and Confmax calculate the
maximum confidence among all the bounding boxes.
Total Variance Loss To further smooth the predictions
over augmented 2D adversarial logos and avoid inconsis-
tent predictions, a total variance loss is enforced [22].
TV(L˜) =
∑
i,j
(|R(L˜)i,j −R(L˜)i,j+1|+ |R(L˜)i+1,j −R(L˜)i,j |)
(3)
where R is denoted as the differentiable renderer in Sec-
tion 3.2. We apply such a notation to emphasize the loss
is computed over pixel values of 2D adversarial logos, and
R(L˜)i,j is one specific pixel value at coordinate (i, j). This
loss is added to improve physical realizability.
The overall training loss we are minimizing is com-
posed of the above two losses (λDIS and λTV are the hyper-
parameters):
Ladv = λDISDIS(I, y) + λTVTV(L˜) (4)
4. Experiments and Results
4.1. Dataset Preparation
Generating Multiple Angle views We generate 2D ad-
versarial images via the Neural Renderer under varying an-
gle views. Specifically, we pick up one specific angle view
as our benchmark view of 0 degree. We fix the rendering
camera view and rotate the 3D human model. We denote
“+” for counterclockwise rotation while “−” for clockwise
rotation. Figure 5 presents an example of our angle view
settings. When synthesized with background images, we
always assume the fixed camera view captures the back-
ground, so there is no further cropping, translation nor rota-
tion operation for background images.
Background Images For training backgrounds, we crawl
a set of real photos from Google search, using keywords
street, avenue, park, and lawn. We manually inspect all
photos and discard those that contain a person or other ob-
ject distractors. We end up with 312 “clean background”-
style images that are used for training. There are multiple
synthesized images generated per background image, de-
pending on how many angle-views we sample. For most of
our experiments (except for single-angle training, see Sec-
tion 4.3.1), we sample over 21 views, leading to a training
set of size 6,741. We scale up testing background images by
sampling over images from MIT places dataset [34] with the
same criterion, generating 32,000 “clean background“-style
images for testing.
Mesh Model Data For the mesh data, we select three
publicly available 3D human models† with complete tex-
tures and coordinate maps. We edit each mesh to select
faces that form our 3D logos under given 2D shape con-
tours. Afterward, we process every 3D logo via OpenMesh
8.0 ‡ to extract its centroid coordinates for our logo trans-
formation step.
4.2. Implementation Details
All experiments are implemented in PyTorch 1.0.0,
along with the Neural Renderer PyTorch implementation§.
We choose the default hyperparameters in the Neural Ren-
derer as: elevation is 0, camera distance is 2.0, ambient light
is 1.0, light direction is 0.0 and the cubic size q in Section
3.2 is 4. For data augmentation, we add the contrast uni-
formly generated from 0 to 1, the brightness uniformly gen-
erated from 0 to 1, and the noise uniformly generated from
−0.1 to 0.1. All three are added pixelwise. The training
is conducted on one Nvidia GTX 1080TI GPU. The default
optimizer is Adam, and the learning rate is initialized as
0.03 and decays by a factor of 0.1 every 50 epochs.
During all experiments, λDIS = 1.0 and λTV = 2.5 in
(4) respectively. The batch size of background images is set
as 8, while the batch size of synthesizing rendering meshes
is set to 1. The total training epochs in the single-angle
training and multiple-angle training (explained in Section
4.3.1) are 100 and 20 respectively.
The default object detectors used are YOLOv2 [19] and
YOLOv3 [20], with confidence thresholds set to 0.6 and 0.7
respectively. Shapes of logo texture we mostly exhibit are
characters of “G” and “H”, while more character shapes are
investigated in our study as well.
4.3. Experiment Results and Analysis
4.3.1 Single- and Multi-angle Evaluation
Single-angle training We first apply our 3D adversar-
ial attack pipeline over single-angle rendering images as
†https://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/
water-park-slides-3d-max/1093267 and https:
//renderpeople.com/free-3d-people/ contain the source
mesh.
‡https://www.openmesh.org/
§https://github.com/daniilidis-group/neural_
renderer
Figure 4. Examples of our adversarial attack to YOLOV2. We perform multi-angle training over three meshes. To justify our work can
attack in different rendering angles, we attach our adversarial logo into different positions on different human meshes (one is in the front
while the other is at the back). We display the results of logo “G” (first row) and logo “H” (second row) under three different views (-10,
0, 10 degrees). The result in three different angle views conceptually verifies that our adversarial logos can prevent the objector detector
from recognizing the person in different poses, even if perturbed by 3D rotations.
Figure 5. An angle view setting example. From left to right: −90
degree, 0 degree and +90 degree for one background image and
one human model.
single-angle training. We illustrate the main idea using 0
degree, for example. Given a mesh, we synthesize our 2D
images with background images in the training set under the
0 degree angle view. Then we train over those images to ob-
tain our adversarial logos and logo texture. The testing im-
ages are rendered under the same 0 degree view and synthe-
sized with test backgrounds. The attack success rate denotes
the ratio of testing samples that that target detector misses
the person. Table 1’s first column compares the results: as
a proof-of-concept, our proposed attack successfully com-
promises both YoloV2 and YoloV3 (appear to be relatively
more robust), under both “H” and “G” logo shapes.
Multi-angle training We then extend to a joint 3D view
training setting called multi-angle training. We uniformly
sample the degrees between [-10, 10] with one-degree in-
crement, leading to 21 discrete rendering views. Under this
setting, both the training set and test set are enlarged by
a multiplier of 21. We compute our multi-angle success
rate by considering averaging the success rates across all 21
views. Results are summarized in the second column of Ta-
ble 1. As can be seen in table 1, a lower success rate implies
that the multi-angle attack is more challenging compared to
the single-angle attack, where no perturbation is considered.
The numbers we report in Table 1 are consistent with
our visual results. Some selective images of our multi-angle
training are shown in Figure 4. As one could observe, our
adversarial logo can mislead the pre-trained object detector
and make the person unrecognizable under both logo “G”
and logo “H”.
Table 1. Results of logos “G” and “H” in single-angle and
multiple-angle training. The baselines are by applying detectors
to the synthesized human images without adversarial logos.
Object Detector Attack Success Ratesingle angle view multiple angle views
YoloV2 (Baseline) 0.01 0.01
YoloV3 (Baseline) 0.01 0.01
YoloV2H 0.86 0.88
YoloV3H 0.91 0.74
YoloV2G 0.79 0.67
YoloV3G 0.60 0.41
Figure 6. A success attack under unseen views with single-angle
training. Our 3D adversarial logo can fool YOLOV2 detector un-
der all 21 angle views, 20 of which are never seen by the detector
when training.
4.3.2 Attack to unseen angle views
Single-angle training with Multi-angle attack To prove
our method is robust against 3D rotations, we conduct a
multi-angle attack with single-angle training. We first train
at 0 degree, but use 21 views ([−10, 10] degree) to attack the
detector. Results shown in Figure 9(b) proves our method
is stable against small model angle perturbations. Figure 6
provides an example where our 3D adversarial logo hides
the person from the detector. Though indistinguishable
from human eyes, tiny perturbations in images cannot be
underestimated in adversarial attacks [33, 1, 5]. Neverthe-
less, our method is not affected by pixel-level changes that
could collapse other 2D patch adversarial works.
Multi-angle training with unseen-angle attack We ex-
tend our experiments to test robustness under more angle
views. After multi-angle training with 21 views in [−10, 10]
degree, we attack the detector using all 101 angle views in
[−50, 50] degree. Figure 7 is plotted based on our success
attack rate overall test images and we provide examples of
unseen view attacks in Figure 8. The plot in Figure 7 re-
veals the limitations of our works. When our rendering view
is away from training views, we observe a decaying curve
that converges to 0 eventually. One plausible explanation is
that clipping of our adversarial logos in rendering pipeline
leads to loss of information from our logo textures, thereby
severely affects our performance.
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Figure 7. The attack success rate for each angle view with multi-
angle training. The detector is YOLOV2 and the training views
([−10, 10] degree) are highlighted within dashed lines. There ex-
ists a massive performance drop when angle view change is rela-
tively large.
Figure 8. Our attack result for YOLOV2 under unseen angle views.
When the camera rotates drastically, part of our adversarial logo
disappeared from the rendered image, and our attack fails when
the unseen view is 50 degree.
4.3.3 Comparison with adversarial patch attacks
For comparison fairness with previous adversarial patch at-
tacks (cf. [25, 3, 6, 29]), we perform single-angle training
in our pipeline and conduct conventional 2D patch adver-
sarial attack [25] as follows: i) We apply masks to gener-
ate 2D patches that obtain identical shape as our logo tex-
ture. ii) Different from our 3D adversarial attack, We add
2D perturbations (translation and rotation) to optimize the
performance of 2D patch adversarial attacks. iii) The com-
parison is to perform the same testing setup, but replace the
logo trained in our proposed method with the masked patch
trained via state-of-the-art. In other words, the major dif-
ference is whether 3D perturbations are considered during
training.
We compare the performance of two schemes under the
multi-angle attack. We synthesize our test images with 38
test background images under 21 different views ([−10, 10]
degree), by applying the identical rendering scheme for both
2D and 3D methods (by replacing logo texture with 2D ad-
versarial patch when performing 2D patch multi-angle test-
ing). Only by this procedure can we ensure the rendered
logos share the same positions and same perturbation under
model angle changes. We compare attack success rate (de-
fined in Section 4.3.1) between two methods and report the
result in Figure 9. We observe that our method outperforms
the conventional 2D patch adversarial attack scheme. Even
at the training view (0 degree), the 2D method fails, due to
the distortion when our logo is dropped on clothes via ren-
dering. This experiment indicates our adversarial logos can
naturally shift as the physical scene changes. We do not re-
quire the patch is either center-aligned or at a fixed position,
whereas the method in [25] obtains a position-sensitive ad-
versarial patch.
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Figure 9. The attack success rate for each angle view in [−10, 10]
degree. We test performance between the 2D adversarial patch at-
tack with our 3D adversarial logo attack on YOLOV2. The dashed
line emphasizes that we only train in a single-angle but test in mul-
tiple angle views.
4.3.4 Shape adaptivity
Although our 3D adversarial logo attack is not restricted
to the shape of the logo, the result in different shapes
reveals that numerical differences originated from differ-
ent shapes are not negligible, as seen in Table 1 and
Figure 10. We select six different shapes (character
“G”,“O”,“C”,“X”,“T”,“H”) as contour of our logo texture.
The motivation is that the first three characters contain
curves and complicated 2D contours while the latter three
consist of parallel and regular contours. We believe these
characters can cover all common cases when designing a
new shape of logo texture. Figure 11 compare their per-
formance when performing multi-angle attack under single-
angle training. It can be seen that the more regular and sym-
metry the shape is, the better attack success rate is attained.
However, this does not hold for the logo of the character
“T”. A possible explanation is that the symmetry along a
horizontal axis might be most crucial to deceive the detec-
tor. Both “C” and “G” outperform “T”, making the letter
“T” the worst result among all logos.
Figure 10. Our shape gallery. Trained logo textures from left to
right are: “G”,“O”,“C”,“X”,“T”,“H”.
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Figure 11. The attack success rate among six different logo shapes.
We conduct a single-angle training (0 degree) and test under 21
different views, with only the shape of logo texture altered.
4.3.5 Attack to unseen human mesh
One goal of our framework is to transfer one logo texture
across all 3D logos on distinctive meshes, and only the logo
texture will be updated via back-propagation. This setting
brings us joint mesh training and promising one-for-all gen-
eralization to attack the detector in different meshes. In
Figure 12, we justify our joint-training maintains consis-
tent performance over unseen meshes. We use two meshes
for training and use the third mesh(The woman) to test our
generated adversarial logo performance. The mean attack
success rate is 40%. Although we did not observe the same
attack success rate compared to same-mesh training, our
method remains its potential to attack in more generalizable
cases where logos are shown on different humans.
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Figure 12. Attack success rate under the unseen mesh. We perform
single view training (0 degree) and test under 21 different views.
Compare to Figure 9, we test our result over a new mesh which is
not seen during training process.
4.3.6 Attack to unseen detector
To test our generalizability across detectors, we choose
Faster-RCNN (Faster Region-based Convolutional Neural
Networks in [21]) and SSD(Single Shot Detector in [15]) as
our targets. We train our adversarial logos on YOLOV2 un-
der [−10, 10] degree of views and feed test images into two
unseen detectors under [−50, 50] degree views. We achieve
42% average attack success rate over SSD while the num-
ber is 46% over Faster-RCNN. Successful and failure exam-
ples for two detectors are shown in Figure 13, respectively.
Note that in [25], the transferability of 2D adversarial patch
attacks to unseen detectors is often in jeopardy. In com-
parison, our 3D adversarial logo appears to transfer better
across unseen detectors, despite not being specifically opti-
mized.
Figure 13. Examples of our 3D adversarial logos in unseen de-
tectors. Left: attack in Faster-RCNN; Right: attack in SSD. The
first eight images in red box is success cases while two right-end
images in green box are failure cases.
5. Conclusion
We have presented our novel 3D adversarial logo attack
on human meshes. We start from the logo texture with
designated shape and diverge to 2D adversarial logos that
are naturally rendered from 3D adversarial logos on human
meshes. Due to differentiable renderer, the update back to
the logo texture image is shape-free, mesh-free, and angle-
free, leading to a stable attack success rate under different
angle views with different human models and logo shapes.
Our method enables a fashion-designed potential in the re-
alistic adversarial attack. In the future, we hope to justify
the feasibility of our method in the physical-world by ex-
amining the printability of our adversarial logos.
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